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Abstract
When Walter Lippmann became a founding editor of the New Republic in 1914, shortly
after the outbreak of World War I, he began to advocate for heightened United States
involvement in global affairs. Lippmann argued that the global power vacuum generated by the
war presented the ideal opportunity for American values to spread to places like Eastern Europe
and South America, the latter under the veil of “Pan-Americanism.” The Pan-American
movement would disguise the U.S. as a “big-brother” to the Latin American nations creating a
seemingly symbiotic relationship, when realistically it would seize the open markets caused by
the war in Europe. Although historians have emphasized Walter Lippmann’s work in drafting the
Fourteen Points in 1917 thereby advancing a global embrace of “national self-determination,”
little attention has been given to the ways Lippmann maneuvered to advance American interests
in the process. Lippmann serves as the lynchpin in the foreign policy transition from aggressive,
militaristic assertion of “hard power” under Theodore Roosevelt, to the morally righteous “soft
power” approach supported by Woodrow Wilson. Lippmann’s efforts are significant because he
had a direct influence on public opinion through his writing in the New Republic and on the
politicians he advised, including Woodrow Wilson. Drawing on the New Republic issues from
1914 through 1918, Lippmann’s personal papers, publications of other New Republic
contributors, and documents from members of the secretive foreign policy think-tank titled “The
Inquiry”, Lippmann’s important role in America’s rise to global power becomes clear. This
paper will argue that Walter Lippmann was a crucial ally in supporting the U.S. emergence as a
contender for world power by extending democratic ideals in a non-democratic fashion, through
both military intervention and economic domination. When Walter Lippmann is viewed as an
early advocate for American hegemonic expansion rather than an author or political
commentator, it encourages us to think of the foundation of America’s active role in the world
beginning during WWI rather than WWII, with one of the most read authors of the 20th century
as a strong advocate.
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Introduction
“Panic in Brussels. Run on Banks. Collapse of Credit,” wrote Walter Lippmann in his
diary on July 29, 1914. His annual European holiday coincidentally placed him only days away
from the German invasion of Belgium. Normally a stylistic and witty master of the English
language, the frantic staccato of his diary entries at the end of July reflect the panic in the air on
the eve of the Great War. Just as his grandfather had fled the aggressive anti-democratic actions
of Prussia after the failed Revolution of 1848, Lippmann, sixty-six years later, sought to flee
German aggression by crossing the Belgian border into Switzerland. Lippmann’s German blood
could jeopardize his safety in Belgium as he noted it was “somewhat dangerous to speak
German” on a train heading toward the Swiss border. A young, rotund and well-tailored product
of uptown New York City, Lippmann was stuck in the middle of an international crisis. He had
been thrust out of his comfort zone with the outbreak of war, and the war would shift his
attention from domestic affairs within the U.S. to global affairs surrounding the European war.
He never made it to Switzerland, instead crossing the English Channel by boat on the night of
July 30, narrowly escaping the Kaiser’s Imperial Army. Only a few days later, on August 4th,
Lippmann watched in astonishment from the balcony of the House of Commons as England
declared war on Germany. Lippmann described his European escapade in 1914 to Ronald Steel
in his authorized biography.1 Although no inspirational Churchill speech was given like in World
War II to spur the 24 year old Lippmann’s interest in the war while in London, he would
nevertheless spend the next four years grappling with the U.S. role in the war and in global
affairs.
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An anxious Herbert Croly and Walter Weyl awaited Lippmann’s return to New York
from England to launch the project that would help Lippmann voice his ideas, the progressive
magazine The New Republic. The magazine blossomed during the publishing renaissance of the
early 20th century United States, by catering to the growing middle class through the recruitment
of leading liberal political theorists as contributors.2 World War I not only served as a turning
point for Walter Lippmann by directing his attention to foreign affairs, but acted as a turning
point for U.S. foreign affairs as a whole. Lippmann and the New Republic had to decide where
they believed the U.S. should stand at the dawn of the global age. Would they “talk softly and
carry a big stick” like Roosevelt or support a collectivized order of nations with the goal of
countering aggression under Wilson? Where Walter Lippmann and the New Republic stood is a
crucial point in understanding America’s rise to global hegemony. Along with America’s stance
in the world in the early 20th century, the opportunity for heightened global influence for the
United States would force Lippmann to develop an opinion regarding American imperialism.
Past studies of diplomatic history during the Wilson Administration have focused heavily
on Wilson himself. Wartime diplomacy is the fulcrum on which the historical debate had largely
been centered, with varying hypotheses for American involvement in the war that all gravitated
around public opinion.3 Arthur Link argued that neutrality for the first three years of the war was
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a direct reflection of American public opinion. It was only until it was clear there would be
dramatic alterations to the geographic and political landscape of Europe that Wilson coaxed the
public into war to ensure a “fair peace”.4 Other historians like Robert Ferrell and Georg Schlid
argued that Wilson was an opportunist that capitalized on the war when he believed he had the
strongest public backing.5 One of the leading Wilson historians, Lloyd Ambrosius, removed
Wilsonian foreign policy from its national boundaries and placed it on a global scale. He then
determined that Wilson’s diplomacy and the diplomacy of other nations were incompatible.6 In
essence, Wilson was ahead of his time. Other nations and leaders lagged in their adoption of a
diplomatic strategy similar to Wilson’s. Lippmann’s role in the formulation of Wilsonian
diplomacy, which maintained prevalence throughout the Twentieth Century, then becomes an
important perspective in the study of WWI American diplomacy.
The revisionist faction of American diplomatic historians, who have argued that
American expansion was for economic gain rather than freedom and democracy, have
challenged the tendency to glorify Woodrow Wilson and his policies. Revisionist history of
American foreign policy in the early 20th century was spearheaded by the prominent historians
William Appleman Williams, George Kennan and Lloyd Gardner beginning in the 1950s. 7 The
revisionist historians criticized Wilsonian liberalism and the exploitation of foreign nations for
the benefit of the United States. For evidence of the exploitation, the revisionists highlighted the
Foreign Relations (New York: Macmillian, 2002); Frank Nincovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy
since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999)
4
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increased involvement of the United States in areas of the world such as Latin America.8 They
interpreted speeches and documents like the Fourteen Points as efforts to increase American
involvement for its own benefit rather than as part of a liberal international movement with
Wilson as the driving force. But more recently, historians have painted Wilsonian diplomacy in
new light. Lippmann falls somewhere in between traditional and revisionist history, by using
freedom and democracy to expand American influence for economic gain.
Recent scholarship has continued to focus on Wilson, as seen in Trygve Thronviet’s
Power Without Victory, but has also focused on topics largely on the genesis of American
“empire.”9 While there is little doubt that the United States established an overseas empire in
1898 after the “splendid little war” against Spain, historians like David Immerwhar have
proclaimed American imperial interests have evolved throughout history.10 Above all, recent
academic study has centered on the implications of Wilsonian rhetoric and actions by Wilson on
previously neglected areas of the world. For example, The Wilsonian Moment by Erez Manela
focuses on the reactions of Korea, Egypt, China and India to Wilson’s call for “selfdetermination” at the end of the war. Manela began with Wilson’s call to end the war and traces
the reactions from Korea, Egypt, China and India to his initial wartime statements, like the
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“Peace Without Victory” speech in 1917. He then analyzed the fallout of Wilson not delivering
his promises during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to the four previously listed groups and
the Anti-Western movements that ensued.11 Where Wilson was the dominating force of study in
the past with outside nations used as evidence for Wilson’s actions, has since created a balance
between Wilson and his impact on the world.
Walter Lippmann’s impact on Wilson and the expansion of American influence around
the world helped shape America’s emergence from the Great War as the up-and-coming world
power. His time with the New Republic during the early part of the war provided him with a
direct influence on public opinion. The rapid growth of the magazine networked Lippmann with
the leading political figures of the 1910s. His web of connected politicians apexed when he
caught the attention of President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson kept a close eye on public opinion
during the war, therefore also keeping an eye on the new magazine which eventually landed
Lippmann a close advisement position with the president. Once Wilson gained the support of
Lippmann, the young editorialist became a foundational figure of the Inquiry (WWI foreign
policy think-tank,) and that is where his greatest contribution to World War I and Wilson’s
presidency was created.
During his time with the New Republic, Lippmann and the other editors advocated for
heightened American involvement in both the war and in other parts of the world. The war in
Europe opened markets in South America, providing the opportunity for a “Pan-American
Movement”. An anonymous editorial written by either Lippmann, Walter Weyl or Herbert
Croly, stated “Such a Pan-American organization seems to us the substitute for the growth of our
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own imperialism”.12 Although Pan-Americanism was disguised as a symbiotic relationship
between the United States and Latin-American nations, the objective of the organization was for
U.S. financial gain. Pan-Americanism is just one example of Walter Lippmann and The New
Republic’s advocacy for a shift from a Rooseveltian colonial imperialism to a more hegemonic
foreign policy approach under Wilson.
This article aims to pinpoint Lippmann’s views and thoughts of America on a global
scale at the dawn of the American Century. It examines why Lippmann’s impact on American
diplomacy was a pivotal part of American history during and after World War I. Lippmann
inadvertently impacted the course of American foreign policy through his advocacy for:
American entry into the war by late 1914, more substantial involvement in the foreign affairs of
other nations, and his work in the peace preparations to end the war through his close
connections with key political figures like Edward House and Woodrow Wilson. Lippmann
joined the Progressive movement in its later stage due to his age and previous political
affiliations with the socialist party, so it is important to first understand the people who
influenced his early political thinking. His brief association with Roosevelt and subsequent
alliance with Wilson coincided with Lippmann’s influence on the foreign policy transition
between the two. Later, Lippmann’s work at the Inquiry did much to expand American influence
around the world.

The Rise and Fall of Lippmann’s Progressive Imperialism
America’s emergence as an industrial powerhouse after the Civil War dramatically
altered the economic, social and cultural landscapes of the nation. The Gilded Age in America
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occurred from the 1870s through around 1900, yielded many innovations, and ushered in
sweeping changes to American society. Four years of the bloody Civil War ended in 1865 with
the North victorious as industrialization triumphed over the agrarian South. In the following two
decades, the United States developed industries and wealth at a rate the world had never seen.
Public and private investments in railroads and electricity altered the landscape of the United
States and the lives of nearly every American.13 Rapid urbanization and the concentration of
wealth in the upper class outpaced the social mobility of lower classes and as a result the less
fortunate urban dwellers were crammed into slums and paid wages that could not sustain even
the most frugal lifestyle. The Gilded Age produced slums like the Five Points neighborhood in
New York City, arguably the most notorious neighborhood of the Gilded Age. One slum house,
dubbed “The Old Brewery” was said to have one murder every night for as long as it provided
housing for the poor.14 The mansions of affluent families like the Vanderbilts showed the bright
side of American industrialization but poverty-stricken workers revealed the vulnerabilities of
the Gilded Age. The eventual emergence of a growing middle class toward the end of the period
led to discontent among middle-class reformers who sought to reconcile the class differences as
many believed no human being should be subject to the horrible conditions of extreme poverty.15
The excesses of the Gilded Age spurred Progressive reform.16 Muckraking journalism
and trust-busting dominated newspapers while the Progressive movement was embraced by the
Republican Party. Aside from Grover Cleveland, every president since Andrew Johnson was a
Republican. It was not until Woodrow Wilson won the highly contested election of 1912 that a
Jean Luc Demeulemeester, “U.S. Economic Growth during the Gilded Age”, Journal of Macroeconomics 31,
(December 2009) 191-199.
14
Tyler Anbinder, Five Points: The Nineteenth-Century New York City Neighborhood that invented Tap Dance,
Stole Elections and Became the World’s Most Notorious Slum (New York, NY: Plume, 2002) 54-57.
15
Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 1983) 13-15.
16
Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and their Politics in the Nineteenth
Century. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) 292.
13

8

Democrat held the highest office in the nation. Republican Progressivism’s pinnacle was when
Theodore Roosevelt won the election of 1901. Although Theodore Roosevelt was directly
involved in the colonization of the newly conquered people of Puerto Rico and the Philippines,
his domestic agenda of expanding the rights of lower- and middle-class Americans appealed to
many. Large numbers of progressives including the future editors of the New Republic threw
their weight behind Roosevelt to accomplish their goals as Roosevelt utilized Progressive
legislation like the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), which sought to dismantle the anti-capitalist
monopolies intent on suppressing competition.
Walter Lippmann’s embrace of progressivism is best understood through the view of the
people who had direct influence on him. Both Croly and Weyl, the other New Republic editors,
were influential progressives that unlike the younger Lippmann had been riding the wave of the
movement since its beginning. Herbert Croly’s Progressive Democracy published in 1914 was a
staple of progressive thought towards the end of the Progressive Era and outlined the thoughts
that influenced Lippmann’s early career. A stronger role of the federal government in business
affairs by promoting competition and the attack on economic abuses and political corruption
were staples of the pre-Lippmann Progressive movement. Early issues of the New Republic
reflect Croly and Weyl’s progressive influence on the young Lippmann. For example, in an
editorial note from early May 1915, Lippmann claimed that Roosevelt was the “leader of the
Progressive movement” due to his support of Progressive legislation during his presidency.17 In
Progressive Democracy (1914) Croly characterized progressivism as a reaction to lasting
conservatism, the conservatism referred to as the Republican domination of the White House

17

Walter Lippmann, Editorial Notes. (May 5, 1915)

9

prior to adopting progressive reform since the Civil War. Regarding the Republican party, Croly
believed progressivism must “replace the old system effectively.”18
Replacing the old system could take a variety of forms, from a conservative backlash to
radical socialism, or something in between. Croly was aware of this fact by his distinction of
progressivism from socialism and populism, other leading ideologies competing for influence in
government in the early Twentieth Century. According to Croly, the Republican Party must
accept the Progressive movement to hold alternative ideas (like socialism) at bay. This would
help the Republican party maintain power.19 Progressivism was not a “top-down” movement in
which the leaders of the parties attempted to impose change on the people, but rather the
contrary. In the chapter “The Ideal and the Program” of Progressive Democracy, Croly described
the Progressive movement as a grassroots, “collective and cooperative action” by the middle
class in an effort to change American society.20 For the Progressive movement to achieve
success, it would need to be a joint effort by all Americans. Croly summarized the Progressive
movement “as not an awakening of public spirit; it’s a rebirth.”21 The rebirth of public spirit is in
response to the aspects of the Gilded Age that progressives wished to change, particularly the
economic disparities between classes that caused millions to live in poverty. The year of
Progressive Democracy’s publication reflects the shift of the progressive movement from
Roosevelt to Wilson, and from the Republican to Democratic party as a result. Much like
Lippmann, and perhaps as an example of Croly’s influence on Lippmann, Croly’s support of
Roosevelt continued over a year into Wilson’s administration. Croly’s shift may have lagged a
bit compared to the wave of progressives that were following Wilson. Croly bestowed the title
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“Father of Progressivism” on Roosevelt even after his 1912 defeat and while the progressive
movement was shifting to Wilson.22 Rather than only represent the populated eastern cities like
many earlier Progressives, Roosevelt “...mixed with all sorts of Americans in many different
parts of the country.”23 Croly seemed skeptical of Wilson calling him “mysterious” and
“conservative” compared to Roosevelt.24 The skepticism would wane into Wilson’s presidency
as most progressives gradually backed Wilson as Roosevelt faded into the past.
Herbert Croly was the man who recruited Walter Lippmann and Walter Weyl to serve as
co-editors for the New Republic. Herbert Croly served as a sort of intermediary between Walter
Lippmann and Walter Weyl as the former was more of a radical, free-spirited political thinker
fresh out of Harvard with a Bachelor’s degree in philosophy compared to the latter, an economist
focused on labor relations in a democracy with a doctorate from the University of
Pennsylvania.25 Born in 1873, Walter Weyl was sixteen years older than Lippmann and
experienced the Progressive Era through its entirety. Weyl is the lesser-known editor of the New
Republic but nonetheless became a progressive leader with his publication of The New
Democracy: An Essay on Certain Political and Economic Tendencies in the United States in
1912, which argued that America was returning to its former democratic greatness due to the
Progressive movement. As Croly’s Progressive Democracy reflected the Progressive Movement
before 1914, Weyl’s The New Democracy was a proclamation for progressivism from 1912
forward.
Weyl described the future of democracy in America as having a direct influence from the
Progressive Movement in response to the division created by conservatism in American
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society.26 Weyl looked back to the creation of the United States in the late eighteenth century as
a more idealistic democracy based on individual rights. To Weyl, the issue then was why did the
ideal democracy disappear? He deduced that the democratic ideals of post-revolutionary
America were lost in the 1830s with the onset of western expansion.27 The idea of Manifest
Destiny eclipsed the egalitarian ideals established during the American Revolution. By the early
years of the Twentieth Century Weyl felt “The mass of men,-the experimental, inventive, but
curiously conservative group of average Americans,-though voting instinctively, is beginning to
feel that in essential respects the nation “conceived in liberty” has not borne its expected
fruits.”28 The “Average Americans” Weyl spoke of was the same middle class that Croly
referenced two years later. Voting was the catalyst for political change in a democracy according
to Weyl and other progressives, including Felix Frankfurter. Veering From the course of
democracy led to disenchantment among Americans, and Weyl feared Americans could turn to
more extreme measures for change such as socialism. To be successful, future progressivism
would need to incorporate both societal changes and aspects of conservatism to combat any
sudden and radical shifts for the American people.29 The Revenue Act of 1916, which raised the
corporate tax rate from one to two percent, is an example of gradual societal change that mixed
the conservative idea of a lower corporate tax while slightly adjusting the tax to fit societal
needs.
Croly and Weyl served as Lippmann’s early Progressive influences, but other more
radical thinkers had a brief impact on the young writer. Rather than follow mainstream
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progressive ideas, these other thinkers flirted with socialism. Prominent socialists and thinkers
including H.G. Wells, Upton Sinlair and the British socialist Graham Wallas are examples of
people who dabbled with both socialism and progressivism in the early 1900s and impacted
Lippmann’s early thinking. Lippmann described Graham Wallas as “persuasive” and “brilliant”
while he was the leader of the British Fabian Socialists, the group that influenced the young
Lippmann to support change through democratic institutions rather than revolutions.30 Lippmann
frequently wrote to Wallas and stayed with him during his turbulent episode in late July 1914
when the nations of Europe mobilized for war. Lippmann’s experiment with socialism did not
last, but it is important to understand the roots of Lippmann’s political thought which began with
socialism.
Socialism’s utopian tease appealed to Lippmann while he was a student at Harvard
University. His time with the aforementioned people like Graham Wallas, H.G. Wells and Upton
Sinclair undoubtedly influenced his early political thinking, but the idealistic postulation became
too unrealistic for Lippmann and he assimilated into the progressive party. Lippmann’s drift
towards political orthodoxy was the early dawn of his expansive political career and would lead
him into contact with other young individuals who themselves became prominent political
figures of the twentieth century. A few of the younger men that shaped the political thinking of
Lippmann were Felix Frankfurter and Winfred Denison, the former as a Supreme Court Justice
and the latter as Assistant Attorney General of the United States. Lippmann’s time with people
like Frankfurter was spent in a Washington bachelor pad named the House of Truth. His stint
with the House of Truth occurred in 1917, but his association with the men of the House began
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years before. Frankfurter dubbed the house the “House of Truth” due to the “lively dinner
conversations” about politics and life.31
The House of Truth was where Lippmann networked with many important men in
Washington to develop his career. Walter Lippmann and his newly-wed wife Faye Alberson
moved into the House in late May, 1917.32 With his wife accompanying him, the male-only
House received its first female occupant. Lippmann first encountered the young thinkers like
Frankfurter and Denison in 1914 during the development stages of the New Republic through the
progressive leader Herbert Croly. Frankfurter became a contributor to the magazine by writing
articles and participating in editorial meetings through the recommendation of Learned Hand, a
federal judge who thought highly of Frankfurter.33 The two developed a volatile relationship that
began with friendship in the House of Truth and ended with a bitter feud. Frankfurter was a
Harvard Law School graduate who caught the eye of Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and President William Howard Taft in his early career. 34 In
1939 he was appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt as a Supreme Court Justice. Clearly,
Frankfurter was well connected to powerful political figures, as was Lippmann. Lippmann and
Frankfurter shared Herbert Croly as a mutual friend, and that is how the two became friends.
Also due to Croly, Lippmann and Frankfurter were introduced to Theodore Roosevelt. When
Roosevelt decided to challenge Taft for the Republican nomination in 1912 Frankfurter was
stuck at a crossroad. Employed by the Taft administration but a firm believer in the words of
Roosevelt, Frankfurter ultimately opposed the sitting president. Although Roosevelt was not
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trained in law as were both Frankfurter and Taft, Frankfurter believed “The Republican party is
the party of liberal construction of the Constitution”. Frankfurter was critical of Taft for
following the constitution with concrete adherence, leading him to believe he was a poor leader
of the Republican party. It would therefore follow logically that Taft would follow the “liberal
construction”, but in the eyes of the young lawyer Taft followed “textual worship of the
Constitution,” and was unrepresentative of the Republican Party.35 Lippmann on the other hand,
was not interested in the constitutional interpretations of the presidential candidates. He was
more interested in labor relations and the advancement of Progressive legislation.
Theodore Roosevelt captivated Lippmann from a young age with his theatrical
orations and heroic actions at San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War. First seeing him
speak in Saratoga, New York as a child, Lippmann knew he found a man to admire. When
Lippmann slowly parted ways with socialism, Roosevelt roped him into the Progressive
Movement. Later in life Lippmann referred to himself as “an unqualified hero-worshiper” during
the time he supported Roosevelt. 36 Roosevelt’s jingoistic rhetoric was overshadowed in the eyes
of Lippmann by the domestic progressive agenda of busting trusts and putting the government
“back in the hands of the people.”37 Roosevelt’s presidency began in 1901 with the assassination
of William McKinley, who only three years before believed God guided him in the decision to
annex the Philippines. Roosevelt’s actions in the Spanish American War and his inheritance of
the newly acquired overseas territory leaves no surprise that Roosevelt was, as was the case for
many powerful leaders at the turn of the twentieth century, an imperialist.
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After allowing William Howard Taft to assume his position as the leader of the nation
and the Republican Party in 1908, Roosevelt again contended for the highest office in the land in
1912. It was in his decision to run as a third-party candidate that Lippman and the men at the
House of Truth as well as the future editors of the New Republic all became outspoken
supporters of the former Rough Rider. Lippmann developed a personal relationship with
Roosevelt after the publication of the young Lippmann’s first book, A Preface to Politics (1913).
Lippmann provided a brief synopsis of the negative treatment of other politicians towards
Roosevelt’s Bull Moose campaign in 1912. In the chapter “Routinner and Inventor” Lippmann
used Roosevelt as an example of “good-and-bad-man theory” which Lippmann claimed as
“disastrous” to the political process.38 Much like Herbert Croly in The Promise of American Life,
Lippmann received Roosevelt’s praise by the positive mention of him in a publication.39 In
Croly’s most well-known work he devoted an entire chapter to Theodore Roosevelt. Lippmann
described the treatment of Roosevelt by the U.S. Senate as inequitable compared to the treatment
of the other candidates. By acknowledging the unfair treatment and deeming it “detrimental” to
the political process, Lippmann elicited an immediate response from the former president.40 The
first of a series of letters and meetings between the two began in May 1913 and continued for
almost two years.
Upon defeat in the 1912 election, Roosevelt embarked on an Amazon hunting trip. In true
Roosevelt fashion, he dealt with his defeat by leading a group of men deep into the Brazilian
jungle.41 Emulating other Great Power leaders like George V of the United Kingdom, Roosevelt
escaped political life by hunting exotic animals. In the jungle he hunted crocodiles and mapped a

38

Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1913) 2-3
Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1909)
40
Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life, 9.
41
“Roosevelt’s Hunting Trip” The New York Times, (Dec 15, 1913)
39

16

small tributary of the Amazon River. But in the process, Roosevelt contracted typhoid fever, a
potentially lethal illness. But if a bullet could not kill the Bull-Moose, neither could sickness.
Roosevelt’s time recovering in the jungle coincidentally exposed the former president to the
young Lippmann’s first book. Instead of searching for his next trophy kill, Roosevelt read
Lippmann’s A Preface to Politics.
The pinnacle of their relationship occurred when Lippmann met his childhood idol.
Roosevelt met with Walter Weyl, Herbert Croly, and Lippmann to discuss their views of the
Progressive movement in 1914 and the direction of the New Republic before its first publication.
Lippmann later recalled the meeting as the eldest of the group (Croly) sleeping in a chair as
Roosevelt rambled into the night with the captivated Lippmann as his audience.42 Roosevelt told
stories of his hunting trips, his time in Puerto Rico during the war in 1898 and his opinion of
labor relations in 1914. A few days later Lippmann recapped the conversation in a letter he sent
to Roosevelt. As an example of the influence Roosevelt held over the magazine, Lippmann
relayed the conversation he and Roosevelt had about labor relations to Walter Weyl, who “took
up the idea with enthusiasm.”43 The enthusiasm is for what Lippmann called “industrial
democracy”. Industrial Democracy would be an increased involvement of workers in negotiating
their terms of employment directly to reign in the control of unions. In the same letter, after
Lippmann’s conversation with Weyl, the men believed they found a “missing link” in the
Progressive movement in the future. Rather than focus on the unionization of workers, as in
young democracies they can be “corrupt and faithless”, the men thought democracy should be
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the way in which workers were represented.44 In 1913 and the earlier half of 1914, Theodore
Roosevelt’s influence on Walter Lippmann was dominated by domestic affairs rather than
foreign, as was the case for many progressives. The outbreak of war on August 1, 1914 in
Europe forced Lippmann and the other editors of the New Republic to shift their focus from
domestic to foreign affairs, as readers expected to read about the war rather than strictly internal
topics like labor relations.
Croly, Weyl and Lippmann had limited exposure to foreign affairs prior to the first issue
of the magazine published in November 1914. After the bloody First Battle of the Marne in early
September 1914 resulting in half a million deaths between the Allied and Central Powers
combined, the New Republic could not ignore the battle raging across the Atlantic Ocean.
Although domestic issues would not be completely overshadowed by the war, Lippmann had no
choice but to develop an opinion about the war in Europe and the extent to which he believed the
United States should be involved. That is when they turned to their progressive idol for advice.
In the first issue of the newspaper on November 7, 1914, an anonymous editorial advocated for
“The End of American Isolationism” by joining the war in Europe. Roosevelt called for the
United States to prepare for war in August on the grounds that the Navy was ill-equipped for a
conflict of such magnitude. The New Republic followed suit claiming the war was a “Challenge
to the United States to justify its independence.”45 The “self-complacent isolation” of the United
States would hinder its ability to influence global affairs.46 At a time when Wilson was calling
for Americans to be “impartial in thought as well as in action,” the New Republic hinted at the
future progression of American foreign policy before Wilson and his advisors were leading the
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drive for peace.47 The New Republic recognized the opportunity presented to the United States to
dominate foreign markets before the European powers could “reconquer and extend their
markets.”48
Much closer to home, another foreign policy situation was boiling over across the Rio
Grande in Mexico. The Mexican Civil War received a great deal of attention from the New
Republic as an assessment of Woodrow Wilson’s views on foreign policy. The Mexican Civil
War captured the imagination of Americans with the obstreperous raids of Pancho Villa on the
border towns of the New Mexico border. A true wild-west figure, Pancho Villa and his “band of
ragged outlaws” galloped across the U.S.-Mexican border with their guns blazing in March 1916
to raid the small town of Columbus, New Mexico.49 The polar opposite of the ragged outlaw, the
highly experienced and well respected General John J. Pershing was dispatched by Wilson to
track down and reprimand Villa in Mexico. After nine months of chasing Villa through northern
Mexico, Pershing returned to the United States empty handed to lead the American
Expeditionary Forces in Europe.50 Although the climax of U.S. involvement in Mexico was the
conflict with Villa, Wilson spent two years prior entangled in the Mexican Revolution. The
diplomatic blunder of the Occupation of Veracruz accomplished the goal of eliminating General
Victoriano Huerta but did little to provide stability in Mexico. The New Republic called the
intervention by Wilson a “failure” for its indecisiveness with only “good intentions” to show
for.51 After Wilson’s decision to intervene, The U.S. had an “enormous moral obligation” to
produce stability in Mexico. The editors did not advocate for an option to allow Mexico to
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independently decide their new government. The United States would either “compel the
Mexicans to police themselves” or come “face to face with the interventionist policy” of outright
conquest.52 Anticipating Wilsonian sentiment, the New Republic advocated for Mexican selfgoverning, and that is of course only if the people could govern themselves. It is important to
note the distinction between self-government and self-determination. Wilson was an advocate for
self-governing rather than self-determination, contrary to popular belief. On one hand selfdetermination would require a hands-off approach by the U.S. government. Self-government on
the other hand would still require involvement of an outside force, whether that was the United
States or the League of Nations.53 In the case of the Mexican Revolution, the New Republic
believed the United States should be involved either politically or militarily, the former favorable
to the latter. The desire to choose military pressure as a last resort shows the earliest drift of
Lippmann from Roosevelt to Wilson. The Rooseveltian action of occupying Vera Cruz had
failed, so a political approach to the issue seemed like a more promising option. The
establishment of a U.S. backed government in Mexico had an ulterior motive for the New
Republic. Pressure by the U.S. could, one of Lippmann’s editorials asserted, be “converted into
Pan-American pressure, and so cleansed of aggression. There are innumerable possibilities like
these which we could profitably discuss.”54 The profitability would be the domination of markets
for the U.S. as the head of the Pan-American organization, which became a reality as the war in
Europe tore the once great nations to shreds. The Pan-American movement will be one of the
fundamental building blocks of Lippmann’s shift to the developing Wilsonian foreign policy.
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The Mexican Civil War was one of Lippmann’s first commentaries about American foreign
policy and helped develop his view of America’s position in world affairs.
America’s role in the Mexican Revolution and World War One were the foundational
pieces in Walter Lippmann’s shift from Roosevelt to Wilson. After the outbreak of war,
Roosevelt called for a comprehensive overhaul of the United States Navy. After all, the Navy
was the “Great Peacekeeper” if a person in the early twentieth century was influenced by Alfred
Thayer Mahan., author of The Influence of Sea Power on History.55 Roosevelt believed the U.S.
must prepare for war or be left out of the peacemaking which, without the aid of the U.S. could
result in a “reckless” treaty that “cannot be kept.”56 Like the New Republic, Roosevelt recognized
the opportunity presented by the war and that the United States should be involved. But it
seemed that is all they had in common about foreign affairs in late 1914 and 1915. In
contemplating U.S. involvement in war, Roosevelt subscribed to “Big-Stick Diplomacy”. The
polar opposite of Wilson, Roosevelt believe the peace negotiations by the U.S. would be
meaningless if the U.S. lacked a strong military to fall back on if things went awry. 57 The New
Republic called for the U.S. to join the war to be a contender in global affairs, so it could
compete for foreign markets. In other words, Roosevelt advocated for outright military
domination of other nations while the New Republic recommended capitalizing on economic
opportunities that were masked as mutually beneficial relationships.
The New Republic and Roosevelt may have disagreed as to why the United States should
join the war, but the disagreement never became personal until two years into the conflict. The
Mexican Revolution was the event that led to a permanent split between Roosevelt and
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Lippmann. The controversial involvement of the United States in Mexico elicited different
responses among Americans, and Roosevelt believed it was the duty of the U.S. to maintain
order for its southern neighbor. Although the New Republic indicated the possible exploitation of
the Mexican situation by the United States, it was critical of the Wilson Administration’s
reluctance to take a definitive stance on the issue. The New Republic dubbed Wilson’s policy on
Mexico as “aimless drifting” for Wilson’s decision to occupy the city of Vera Cruz and for
taking no further steps to become involved and ultimately left the city with little accomplished.58
Roosevelt blamed Wilson for numerous problems in Mexico, going as far as blaming him for the
drunkenness of a U.S. general in Vera Cruz. The editors of the New Republic believed Roosevelt
took his criticism too far and blasted him in an early 1915 editorial claiming he was “out of
hand” with his comments about the president.59 Roosevelt took the criticism personally and so
began the decline of the Roosevelt-New Republic coalition spearheading the Progressive
movement in the mid-1910’s.
Lippmann’s criticism of Roosevelt was ill-received by the other New Republic
contributors, especially Herbert Croly. Roosevelt, the “father of progressivism”, was the
foundational figure of the New Republic’s formation. How would they progress without their
progressive leader? Although Lippmann grew quite fond of Roosevelt, he viewed Roosevelt’s
progressivism as “dated” and that “the future is looking towards Wilson.”60 As the younger,
more rebellious editor of the magazine, Lippmann wrote a scathing criticism of Roosevelt while
Croly and Weyl were on vacation in April, 1916. In “A Luncheon and a Moral,” Lippmann
shows his complete departure from Roosevelt in stating “it is the business of Progressives to do

“Editorial Notes” The New Republic (November 28, 1914)
“Roosevelt on Mexico” The New Republic (March 15, 1915)
60
Walter Lippmann, “A Luncheon and a Moral” The New Republic (April 6, 1916)
58
59

22

something more than to nominate Theodore Roosevelt.”61 Lippmann even went as far as
lambasting the “hero-worshippers” of Roosevelt by writing: “They (Roosevelt followers) are
pretty gullible citizens who are so blinded by Mr. Roosevelt’s virtue that they cannot remain
openly and good-humoredly critical of him.”62 It is important to remember that Lippmann
himself claimed he was an “unqualified hero-worshipper” of Roosevelt only two years earlier.
Perhaps the best explanation for Lippmann’s near effortless shift away from Roosevelt
was the young editor did not have political loyalty to the Republican party. Lippmann was a
progressive, not necessarily a Republican. The Republican party was the medium to which the
progressive movement could advance. With the election of Wilson and his progressive platform
in 1912, the movement had little choice but to drift towards the newly elected Democratic
administration. Although not written by Lippmann, Edgar E. Robinson summarized the state of
the Republican Party by mid-1915 in an editorial titled “A Future for the Republican Party.”
Robinson claimed that the Republic party had resorted to propaganda for the first time in decades
as it was “on the offensive” with a Democrat in the White House.63 In other words, the
Republican party was in trouble if it failed to adapt to the changing political landscape in 1915.
The split between conservative and liberal Republicans within the party was the reason Wilson
was elected, according to Robinson.64 Lippmann had been a Republican for only three years
during his rendezvous with Roosevelt. Contrary to Croly or Weyl, Lippmann had little invested
in the Republican party, allowing him to shift to the Democratic Party.
While Lippmann may have had little trouble in shifting to the Democratic Party, he
struggled with forming his foreign policy thoughts. Roosevelt influenced Lippmann’s early
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opinion of America’s foreign policy situation during the war. But, like their relationship,
Roosevelt’s influence did not last. Like Roosevelt, The New Republic did believe the United
States needed to enter the war in 1914 to strengthen its global influence. The magazine criticized
Wilson’s acts of neutrality and ultimately sided with Roosevelt. But differing thoughts on
“aggression” signified the early transition to Wilson’s brand of wartime foreign policy. The first
issues of the New Republic may have hinted at Lippmann beginning to shy away from
Roosevelt’s foreign policy. The editorial notes of November 21, 1914 asked a series of rhetorical
questions about the foreign policy of the U.S. and other nations and their regards to aggression
and imperialism. Lippmann began the note by simply stating “What constitutes aggression?”65
He then asked if Germany sending a gunboat to Agadir was aggressive. It seems by starting the
list with an event fresh on the minds of many people (Agadir Crisis in 1911) as an act of
aggression, the acts that follow may not seem as serious. Germany dispatched the gunboat SMS
Panther to Morocco in response to French military intervention in a Moroccan rebellion.
Germany’s justification for the gunboat was to protect trade interests, but its goal was to test
French and British relations.66 Rather than divide the two, the aggressive measure solidified the
relationship between the powers. The plan backfired, creating one of many diplomatic blunders
of German Weltpolitik. The term “gunboat diplomacy” came from the Agadir crisis, so it is safe
to say many readers in 1914 would say it was aggressive. Gunboat diplomacy is when one nation
pressures another by flexing its military muscles. He then lists other events that occurred like
England’s actions in the Boer War and France’s occupation of Morocco, but among others he
sneaked in two very interesting questions. The first was “were we aggressive when we took the
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Philippines?” and the other was “is the Monroe Doctrine aggressive?”67 While Lippmann
provided no answers to the questions, inferences and speculation may provide some insight.
Lippmann was not politically active when the United States won the Spanish-American
War and annexed the Philippines. In fact, he was only ten years old. Lippmann therefore was not
involved in the U.S. decision to annex the Philippines, and he based his view U.S. control of the
territory on second-hand thoughts from Roosevelt. Lippmann believed U.S. control of the islands
would be better than that of other powers, such as Germany or England.68 His opinion of the
Philippine Question, which was that the U.S. should maintain control of the island rather than
another power, showed Roosevelt’s influence on his early foreign policy opinion. The
Philippines proved to be a financial burden on the United States, which Lippmann
acknowledged, but he provided no solution to the financial drain on the nation. Lippmann
believed nations would be better off “independent” while the United States controlled their
markets. Unlike his thoughts on the Philippines, Lippmann and the Monroe Doctrine are more
difficult to pin down. The Monroe Doctrine had deterred Europe from further colonizing the
Western Hemisphere for one hundred years. The irony of the early enforcement of the Doctrine
was the heavy reliance on the most powerful European nation. The backbone of the Monroe
Doctrine was the Royal Navy, acting as a “bouncer” to kick the other European powers out of the
hemisphere. If the U.S. could assume control of Latin American markets, England would have
little reason to be in the Western Hemisphere. England’s absence from the hemisphere would
make the Monroe Doctrine exclusively American. On the surface it seems Lippmann and the
New Republic viewed the Monroe Doctrine as a symbiotic relationship between the United States
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and Latin American nations. Further analysis of New Republic issues show there may have been
more to the Monroe Doctrine than just mutual benefits from a collation of western hemispheric
nations.
By 1916 Lippmann abandoned Roosevelt and his version of American foreign policy.
Before the Roosevelt-Lippmann break Lippmann began to shed his “old world” imperial coat
and adopt a new form of imperialism. In an anonymous editorial titled “the Higher Imperialism”,
the editor described the changed form of imperialism as a response to colonial aggression which
was viewed by the New Republic editors as a cause of war.69 The “Old World Imperialism will
die out” and a “pacific super-imperialism” will generate “peace with profits”.70 There would be
no profits for the United States if it did not establish a “sphere of influence” and foreign markets
were dominated by other nations. The “spheres of influence” would not result in the outright
colonization of nations. American investments would be protected by military intervention only
if independence threatened U.S. market control. In more simplistic terms, the “Higher
Imperialism” would be a loose coalition of nations that through “international haggling” and the
creation of “machinery for dealing with international disputes” could create a lasting peace.71
The coalition of nations would eventually emerge as the League of Nations, the brainchild of
Woodrow Wilson.
The sphere of influence was already created. The Monroe Doctrine essentially gave an
entire hemisphere to the United States while the other powerful nations would vie for the other
half of the world. The Monroe Doctrine came to be known as “Pan-Americanism” as it aged into
the twentieth century, and it seemed that Pan-Americanism became a central focus of the New
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Republic by 1915. The term “Pan-Americanism” described the commercial and political
cooperation of North and South American nations. South American nations were “skeptical” of
the Monroe Doctrine because the opportunity for American domination was always present. The
nations were “Pan-American in a lukewarm way” meaning they were inherently tied to the
United States due to their geographic location and dependence on the Monroe Doctrine to
“protect from European aggression” but they were never completely sold on the idea.72 PanAmericanism was marketed to the Latin American nations as having “immediate, substantial and
incontestable” advantages.73 According to the New Republic, the Latin American nations had
softened up to the Monroe Doctrine due to the U.S. treatment of Puerto Rico and Cuba after the
Spanish-American War.74 While the nations may have cozied up to the thought of American
protection, the European powers still dominated the markets as they had for hundreds of years.
The opportunity to shift Latin American markets from Europe to the United States is where
Lippmann thought the First World War could lend a hand in the rise of American hegemony.
The Pan-American Movement was just one of many solidarity movements occurring in
the early Twentieth Century. Although they shared a similar goal, they all possessed unique
characteristics for why they were occurring. For example, the Pan-Islamic movement was
centered around Turkey with Islam as the unifying force. In Asia, a Pan-Asian movement was
centered around Japan after it proved to be a global contender for power after the RussoJapanese War in 1906. The difference between the two was that the Pan-Asian movement was
backed by an emerging empire and the Pan-Islam movement was a reaction to the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire and the threat of Western intervention in the affairs of the Islam dominated
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Middle East.75 The Wilsonian rhetoric at the end of the war inspired hope with the non-western
solidarity movements, but the rejection of the Racial Equality Clause by Wilson and the
expanded British and French influence in the Middle East after the war drove the movements to
become increasingly Anti-Western and emphasize strong nationalism.76 The Racial Equality
Clause was a proposed amendment to the League of Nations Covenant by the Japanese that
would generate racial equality among all nations participating in the League.77 The exclusion of
the Japanese in all Peace Conference affairs besides those pertaining to the Far East and the
rejection of the Racial Equality Clause by Wilson and the other “Big Three” delegates soured
diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan for over two decades.78 The Pan-Islam,
Pan-Asian and Pan-American movements were a reaction to the downfall of the European
Empires which never fully recovered after World War One.
The American hegemonic approach to foreign policy was seen in Lippmann’s advocation
for American involvement in the Mexican revolution. Lippmann followed Wilsonian thoughts
before Wilson made them his priority during the war. While contemplating his questions of
aggression, Lippmann hinted at the idea that would become the center piece of his work with
The Inquiry. Lippmann used the almighty buzzword of 1919, “Self-Determination”, as a possible
justification for American involvement in the Mexican Revolution.79 Lippmann asked “was our
refusal to recognize [Victoriano] Huerta an act to further self-determination in Mexico?”80 As
was the case before, it is merely a rhetorical question. But the fact that Lippmann acknowledged
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“Self-Determination” with the actions in Mexico demonstrates a connection between PanAmericanism, the idea of “Self-Determination” and ultimately American domination of these
markets under the guise of a symbiotic relationship. Wilson justified the Mexican intervention by
claiming it advanced “self-determination” for the Mexican people as he believed Huerta seized
power without the consent of the Mexican people.81 The Pan-American idea was marketed to
Latin American nations like Mexico and Panama as being more of a burden than a benefit to the
United States. The “Pan-Americanism” editorial stated “The United States would be making a
greater sacrifice than would her Latin American sisters”, meaning it would not benefit the United
States as much as it would the Latin American nations.82 But, all was not as it seemed. While
Pan-Americanism may have mascaraded as the next step in decolonizing Latin America, it was
the first step in American domination of its markets through the exploitation of domestic raw
materials and the monopolization of manufactured goods.
The preoccupation of the European Great Powers presented the ideal situation for
American economic gain, according to the Lippmann and the other New Republic contributors.
The “Pan-American Union has painted in glowing colors the business opportunities to be found
in South and Central America”, showing that the United States was not seeking outright cultural
and social domination like that which aligned with the thinking of Theodore Roosevelt. The
United States could respect the idea of “self-determination” for a nation while capitalizing on its
markets, a characteristic developed under Wilson.83 In true imperial fashion, the New Republic
believed in regard to Latin America, “we must now sell our manufactured goods abroad and
import raw products for our own consumption.”84 The extraction of raw materials from the Latin
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American nations, manufacturing them into finished goods and selling them back to the nations
in which they came for a profit was at the heart of what Lippmann and the other editors were
advocating for. The mastermind behind the New Republic’s embrace of the Pan-American
movement was Ronald G. Usher, a professor of history at Washington University. Although
Usher had received little attention for his work on foreign affairs, his publication PanAmericanism: A Forecast of the Inevitable Clash Between the United States and Europe’s Victor
in 1915 may have influenced Lippmann during his time at the New Republic.85 Usher argued that
the United States must become more involved in global affairs as the war in Europe revealed
may opportunities for economic advancement.86 An adequate summary of what Lippmann and
the other editors believed regarding the “Higher Imperialism” came in an interview with
“Professor Munsterberg” who said “it is the time to begin the sacred work which could alone
could bring us the blessed age of our vision, The United States of the World.”87 The “sacred
work” the professor referenced was precisely what Lippmann believed, for the United States to
capitalize on the foreign markets as Europe was tearing itself apart. Lippmann may not have
called for a “United States of the World” as “Professor Munsterberg” had, but they both
recognized the economic opportunities presented by the war.
By the summer of 1915 it was clear Roosevelt’s ideas had aged for the worse. Lippmann
severed his ties with the former president and set his sights on Wilson. The Lippmann-Wilson
relationship seemed inevitable by the similarity in ideas between the two, and Wilson gave
increased attention to public opinion as the war continued. By the summer of 1915 the ideas of
the two converged and Lippmann became a very early advocate for what Wilson would
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accomplish in his second term. When analyzing a conference in Pennsylvania aimed at peace,
Lippmann commended the sensible thinking of the delegates for avoiding utopian rhetoric like
outlawing war.88 The founders of the Kellogg-Briand Pact may have found Lippmann’s advice a
decade in the future to be useful. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was created in 1927 and effectively
outlawed war. As crazy as that may sound due to the deadliest conflict in human history breaking
out twelve years later, Frank Kellogg and Aristide Briand created the pact in attempt to save
lives of soldiers.89 Lippmann claimed that “a league of nations that should give power to
international law” was the way to avoid another large-scale conflict like WWI.90 This was, of
course, the same League of Nations that we would see in 1919. Lippmann’s justification for a
conglomerate of nations was based on the success of the United States federal government. The
United States was once a “league of foreign states” until after the Civil War when the country
truly unified. Like the United States, the League of Nations would consist of individual states,
working independent of their own agendas, under the auspices of a federal government 91
Lippmann’s choice of the United States as the model for the league was due to the territorial size
and the “internal peace” of the nation compared to the nations of Europe at the time.92 The PanAmerican union was based on a similar platform as the proposed league, but with the U.S. as the
powerful entity. The Pan-American Union would be composed of American nations, but the
United States would have the “final say” in making decisions. Pan-Americanism was framed as
an “American International Concert” with the United States as larger entity with the smaller
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nations under its “mutually beneficial” umbrella, or so the United States wanted the smaller
nations to believe.93
It was in 1916 that Lippmann seized the opportunity to meet the sitting president and
make an informed decision about who he would support in the 1916 election. When he met the
sixty year old president in the summer of 1916 he made the outright conversion to Wilson when
he “showed (me) the inside of his mind” rather than answer the questions Lippmann prepared.94
The clear parallel in thought over the irrational and dated Roosevelt foreign policy of “saberrattling” and the gradual drift out of neutrality as neutrality became increasingly difficult as the
war dragged on influenced Lippmann’s admiration for the president in 1916. Lippmann
supported American entry into the war, and by 1916 Wilson was preparing for just that.
Lippmann became an early convert from Roosevelt’s Republican Progressivism to that of the
Democratic party, which proved to be a challenge for him at the New Republic. Croly, Weyl and
Frankfurter, among others, were still on the Republican side of the Progressive fence. The
Republican party nominated Charles Evan Hughes to challenge Wilson in the upcoming election,
and Wilson needed all the support he could get. That is where Lippmann became a valued
supporter of Wilson, by converting his friends and the New Republic to the emerging Wilsonian
Progressivism.95
The United States entry into the European war on April 6, 1917 was the moment in which
Lippmann’s earlier ideas of American foreign policy came to fruition. Woodrow Wilson’s
“Peace Without Victory” speech only a few months before showed Wilson’s desire for peace,
and that the emerging Great Power was now willing to intervene. In the part of peace-making,
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Wilson believed “it is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in
that great enterprise.”96 The decision to be involved in the war was a drawn-out affair spanning
almost three years. As the war dragged on and the United States continued to fund the Entente
Powers it became increasingly difficult to remain neutral. Although Wilson wished to broker
peace to make it “virtually impossible for any such catastrophe (to) ever overwhelm us again”,
he also recognized the opportunity at hand.97 The catastrophe he noted can be interpreted as a
reflection to the treatment of the Confederate South by the Union North after the Civil War
which, as a Southerner from Virginia, continued to haunt and influence his thinking well into the
Twentieth Century.98 It was clear by 1917 that the powers involved were nowhere near as
supplied and powerful as in 1914, and a fluctuation of morale both in the trenches and at the
home fronts showed the fragility of the situation. Wilson believed that placing guilt on one party
or the other would only lead to further conflict down the road. In hindsight, it seems Wilson may
have caught a glimpse of what was to come with interwar period tensions and ultimately WWII.
If a “Peace without Victory” was brokered by Wilson in early 1917 it would leave the European
powers with dignity and strength and hopefully no further turmoil would result.99 The occasion
gave the United States the chance to become the “pre-eminent” power and it could rise out of the
global conflict as a contender for international power. But, the call for peace by Wilson went
unanswered, and the activation of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany finally pushed
Wilson to approach the Senate on April 2, 1917 to declare war on the Central Powers.100
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Lippmann became an advocate for the United States entering the war in Europe under the
guidance of Wilson as it became a calculated and strategic move, contrary to the reactionary
aggression which Roosevelt advocated for three years prior. Entering the war was the easy part.
Creating peace after an entire continent was torn to shreds was more difficult. The first gestures
towards peace occurred in December, 1916. Germany proposed a compromised peace with the
Allies as a diplomatic maneuver to retain power in Central Europe. While it seemed to be just
one of the many diplomatic maneuvers taken by the Central Powers during the war, it proved to
be a catalyst in Lippmann’s rise to presidential advisement and influence. After hearing it
straight from the president that either the Allied Powers would have to accept German
supremacy of the continent (France would never accept such terms) or unrestricted submarine
warfare would force the United States into the war, Lippmann wrote an editorial titled “Peace
Without Victory”.101
In the “Peace Without Victory” editorial, Lippmann called for the rejection of the
German peace plan, which would have allowed Germany to retain its newly acquired territory in
Flanders and in in the East. Lippmann called for its rejection due to German expansion without
“annexing a foot of territory” through the domination of its allies, namely the weaker AustroHungarian and Ottoman Empire, effectively making them satellite states of their more powerful
ally. Essentially, Lippmann was advising against establishing what he wished for in the Western
Hemisphere, an American hegemony over Latin America. German hegemony would tip the
European balance of power heavily towards the German Empire and the British Empire would
no longer be a competitor. Lippmann feared the German Empire would expand through the
Balkans and into the Middle East and nearby states like Romania would come under German
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influence. A “loss of prestige” for the Allied Powers was conditional on the acceptance of the
“Peace Without Victory” which England could in no way accept.102 A little over a year later
Germany would annex a massive portion of Western Russia from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
with the new Soviet Union, which would only have tightened the grasp Germany held on Central
and Eastern Europe if the December call for peace was accepted.
At first glance it may seem that Lippmann borrowed the famous phrase from Wilson.
Actually, the editorial was written one month before Wilson gave the speech to Congress. Why
then, did Wilson use the phrase if it was not original? Perhaps it was because of the increased
attention Wilson was giving to Lippmann and the New Republic. Lippmann believed the “world
expected” the United States to “share the responsibility of peace.”103 While that sounds like
typical Wilsonian rhetoric towards the end of the war, the League of Nations proposed by
Lippmann would place the America as the “pre-eminent” world power and markets, particularly
Latin American markets, could provide outlets for United States manufactured goods and a
reciprocal return of raw materials to support the emerging global industrial powerhouse.
Lippmann’s increased participation in Wilson’s preparation for war and peace also
brought him into contact with Edward House, the Texas progressive who became Wilson’s righthand-man while president. Lippmann became a frequent visitor to Edward House when he stayed
in Washington with his friends at the House of Truth. Lippmann’s rise to political influence
landed him a stint with the Secretary of War, Newton Baker that lasted around six months. The
transition to bureaucracy marked his leave of absence from the New Republic while he gave his
complete attention to the global war. His time with the War Department came to an end when
House approached him about a new project being created by Wilson. The project began without
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a name, or personnel, or an area to meet. It began as an idea. An idea that would become the first
think-tank created by the United States government comprised of non-government scholars
tasked at solving the problem of peace after the war.
The project would be known as “The Inquiry”. Wilson asked House to create an
organization to provide information for the impending peace conference when the war came to a
close, one composed of historians, philosophers, geographers and professors, among others.104
While the Inquiry itself is secondary to the study of Walter Lippmann’s influence on American
foreign policy during World War I, it is nonetheless important to first understand the platform
from which Lippmann asserted influence on policy at the end of the war. After all, the peace
conference was the medium through which America advanced its global ambitions. The Inquiry
was a secretive organization that flew under the radar of the media spotlight to gather
information for the peace conference. Notable scholars form the Inquiry included the geographer
Isaiah Bowman, historian James T. Shotwell, international law scholar David Hunter Miller and
of course, Walter Lippmann.105 Wilson himself advised House to put Lippmann on the
Inquiry.106 Lippmann’s connections with both the New Republic and the president made him a
prime candidate for work in the organization, but did not give him a clear position to fill.
Lippmann was not a foreign policy “scholar,” and he held no previous position in foreign affairs.
He voiced his opinion on the war in Europe in his editorials but held no formal training or
experience in the field. What Lippmann did have experience in was making connections and
being at the “right place and right time.” So, Lippmann set about recruiting people to join the
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organization when it began. The issue with recruitment was an overall lack of professionals in
the specific fields of study needed, like Eastern European and African history or international
law. Due to the “famine of men” in these fields, the Inquiry was forced to “create its own
experts” for Russia, the Balkans and Turkey.107 It seems fabricating experts would produce
unreliable results, but Lippmann relied on “sheer genius” for the “practically unexplored” realms
of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.108 Examples of the “inexperienced experts” included
Dana C. Munro, the European Medieval historian who was the head of Middle Eastern research
(an odd combination) and the geologist Nevin Fenneman who was assigned to research African
questions. In the early days of the group Lippmann received the second highest salary, trailing
only James Shotwell and earning more than the leader of the group Sydney Mezes who ranked
fourth.109 Lippmann was officially given the title Secretary of Research when the terms of the
organization were solidified and he created an outline of priorities for the group consisting of 11
main points.110 The points serve as an early precursor to the Fourteen Points with a mention of
“freedom of the seas” (V) and “economic, racial and physical maps for territory from the Baltic
Sea to the Persia Gulf… including Alsace-Lorraine and Poland.” (II)111 The final and perhaps
most interesting point was “the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Settlement”.112 Again the
Monroe Doctrine seeped into Lippmann’s thoughts as he shaped the U.S. role in global affairs at
the beginning of the twentieth century. The peace settlement was centered around Europe, as that
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was where the greatest changes would take place. The Monroe Doctrine was specific to the
Western Hemisphere where no major territorial alterations would occur, so it may seem odd that
the relation of Monroe Doctrine to the European settlement is explicitly stated so early in the
peace preparation. The continued emphasis placed on the Monroe Doctrine from the beginning
of the war through the beginning of the peace conference show Lippmann’s desire for the United
States to rise from the depths of the global conflict as the dominate economic power on Earth.
The fact that Latin America received such attention by the Inquiry is interesting because
after all, the war was on the other side of the world. A possible explanation for the attention
given to Latin America is the convergence of various interests by Inquiry researches, including
Isaiah Bowman, Bailey Willis (Chief of Latin American Division) and Lippmann. The allocated
budget for Latin American studies began at thirty thousand dollars and only grew when Bowman
assumed the role of Secretary of Research in 1918.113 To put the amount into perspective,
international law was given eleven thousand dollars and regional research was given around
twenty eight thousand dollars.114 The peace conference relied heavily on international law with
the formation of the League of Nations, so it was surprising it received less than a third of the
funding. An advocate for Latin American funding, Isaiah Bowman was the director of the
American Geographical Society which was used by the Inquiry as a private space “free from the
public eye” to quietly gather knowledge for the president when the New York Public Library
could no longer hold the growing organization.115 The important role of geography to determine
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the boundaries of the new European states, and the AGS resources available including large scale
maps and data made it an ideal location for the scholars to meet.116
When the logistical details of creating the organization were hammered out after months
of preparation, the Executive Committee wasted no time in gathering information for the
president. The Executive Committee consisted of Mezes, Miller, and Lippmann, and by the end
of 1916 the group wrote a staple of WWI diplomatic charters. Out of the three, Lippmann was
the chief author of the Fourteen Points draft, which was the formulation of Inquiry research in its
early months.117 Woodrow Wilson’s speech was given on January 8, 1918 to assert the terms by
which a post-war peace would be established. The Fourteen Points became famous as an early
piece of decolonization policy that could create both a lasting peace and a pseudo “Peace
Without Victory.” The points, though, were not created overnight. It took months of data
analysis including the study of ethnic boundaries in the crumbling empires of Austro-Hungary,
Turkey (Ottoman) and Germany by leading scholars at the Inquiry to make educated suggestions
for the president. Like the earlier pieces written by Lippmann including those about PanAmericanism and American entry in the war, the call to end the war on the terms of the Fourteen
Points was Lippmann’s and in turn Wilson’s way of positioning the United States as a leading
global power.
Lippmann viewed his work on the Fourteen Points as “putting words in the mouth of the
president.”118 Wilson did not take his exact words from the early draft, named “The Present
Situation: War Aims and the Peace Terms it Suggests,” but he weighed the advice heavily in his

Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalism (Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 2004) 113.
117
Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 122.
118
Walter Lippmann, “Letter to Isaiah Bowman, December 2, 1917” Letter. From Yale University, The Papers of
Walter Lippmann, 1889-1976 Box 3, Folder 11, Reel 138b.
116

39

final draft of the Fourteen Points. The Executive Committee viewed the United States as the king
of the chess board of peace, with the “Poles, Czechs, South Slavs, and Bulgaria” as the pawns for
limiting German influence in Middle Europe. If those groups were to become either satellites of
Germany or outright absorbed into the empire, Germany would become the “Master of the
Continent.”119 Due to Germany’s geographic position and possible military dominance of its
weaker neighbors, the “MettleEuropa” dream of German Chancellor Theobald von BethmannHollweg was not out of the question. MettleEuropa was a part of Bethmann-Hollweg’s plan for
German European hegemony named the “Septermberprogramm”. In effect, the groups
surrounding Germany, listed by the Executive Committee, would be absorbed by the German
Empire and the empire could gain strength. The strength would then lead to the eventual
domination of Belgium and France, which could be reduced to vassal states.120 Lippmann’s
effort to try to prevent German hegemony in Europe was a direct reflection of his “Peace
Without Victory” editorial written a year earlier, when he advocated against German continental
hegemony.121 The irony of course was that while Lippmann worked to control the power of
Germany, he hypocritically supported policies that would expand American influence on a
global scale. Perhaps his advocation for German power limitations would create a power vacuum
in Eastern Europe that the United States could fill. Overall, the goal of peace for the United
States would be the “Disestablishment of a Prussian Middle Europe” which took the form of the
latter nine points of the Fourteen Points Address.122
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It was no surprise that the first suggestion made by the Executive Committee would
coincide with Lippmann’s progressive views in the late 1910’s. In an effort to curb Prussian
Militarism, the Executive Committee suggested to “increase democratization of Germany”.123
Increased democratization would consist of power delegated to elected representatives to control
the army and navy, and increase ministerial and foreign policy control which would put the
power into the hands of the people rather than the Prussian elite. In addition to pushing a
democratic movement on the German people, the Inquiry suggested the “control of the two
military terminals of Berlin-Baghdad (to) remain in the hands of an administration friendly to the
western nations”.124 The ill-defined phrase “friendly to the western nations” could mean a variety
of things. On one hand it meant that Germany and Turkey would not ally against the soon-to-be
victorious western powers. On the other hand, the term “friendly” meant an administration that
would kowtow to the demands of the Allied Powers. If Lippmann’s goal of making the United
States the “pre-eminent” power after the war was completed, an administration friendly to the
Allied Powers would be an administration ultimately subject to the United States. If the latter is
to be inferred by the stated objective, it would be a similar situation to the American occupation
of Veracruz and the overthrow of the Huerta administration; What seemed like the promotion of
“self-determination” on the surface was really the Pan-American movement implemented by the
United States on a global scale.
The demobilization of German militarism required a fine balance between German
industrialization and economic opportunity, and the possibility of discontent among the German
civilian working class and military if the government demobilized and industrialized too
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quickly.125 When assessing the assets of the United States to enforce the nations war aims, he
was quick to note that the economic well-being of post-war Germany was in the hands of the
United States. In the first section of the memorandum titled “Assets”, Lippmann clearly stated
that the “commercial control of the outer world….lies in our hands.”126 Lippmann believed the
asset most valuable for coaxing Germany into abiding by the terms of peace was the “possibility
of German exclusion both from the sources of raw materials and the richer markets”.127 Due to
the radical shifts in European demographics at the end of the war through the dissolution of
multiple empires, it was unclear what exactly those markets would be. A possibility of course
would be Latin America, which was abundant in both raw materials and rich markets due to
European preoccupation with the war. Lippmann recognized that “Germany’s exclusion from
Central and South America” was a bargaining chip to influence German cooperation.128 What the
Executive Committee offered Germany was an ultimatum. Either Germany cooperates with
Allied demands and democratizes, or it will be excluded from “freedom of intercourse”, namely
new markets and raw materials to catalyze industrial growth.129 Before the Allied victory,
Germany ruled over the Shantung and German South-West Africa which provided the raw
materials to manufacture for sale in the western markets. The Allied powers stripped Germany of
their colonial possessions upon defeat and controlled the nation’s access to foreign markets.130
Rather than offer mere suggestions, the final section of the memorandum provided
concrete peace terms for the president to consider. Many of the terms were nearly identical to the
finalized Fourteen Points but with further alterations to language. There was one exception to the
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parallels between the memorandum and the speech, being the Alsace-Lorraine question.
Lippmann and Mezes stated, “The wrong done in 1871 must be undone” due to the fact that
Germany “proclaimed these provinces are foreign territory.” 131 David Hunter Miller dissented
after the document was produced and stated that Germany should still be able to capitalize on the
industry of the region even though it would once again be in French hands.132 Wilson ultimately
never sided with either Miller or Lippmann and ambiguously stated that the “wrong done to
France in 1871 must be undone, (borrowing the phrase from the Inquiry) and should be
righted…in the interests of all.”133 Wilson blended the ideas of Lippmann and Miller by
advocating for the restoration of the territory to France, but included Germany through the
phrase “all,” which could allow for German economic interests in the area. Since Lippmann was
trying to limit German economic domination of Europe in fear it could compete with American
hegemony, it makes sense that he would advise against German influence in an economically
important area.
Woodrow Wilson’s statement of U.S. war aims was given to a joint session of Congress
on January 8, 1918. The Fourteen Points speech was given only after the memorandum was
completed on December 22, 1917 and an expanded copy with explanations of the research was
given to House on January 2, 1918.134 Wilson then edited the draft to fit his liking and added the
first five points of the draft, which did not directly reflect Inquiry research but echoed topics that
were supported by Inquiry personnel. The topics included freedom of the seas (Point II) unless
“closed by international action for the enforcement of international covenants” and the “free,
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open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of territorial claims” (Point V), or the clause
famously associated with self-determination.135 Freedom of the seas was a direct response to the
restricted trade the United States experienced while it was a neutral country. The naval blockade
of the Royal Navy restricted American trade with Germany, and as a neutral nation the United
States had the right to trade with either side in the war.136 Lippmann wrote about the stifling of
American trade in the war in early 1915. He claimed that England was equally as threatening to
neutral involvement in the war as Germany, shown through the rejection of England to allow
Germany to import food and raw materials for the benefit of the civil population.137 England
practiced “unregulated capture at sea of suspicious vessels” which had never sat well with
Americans, branching back to the War of 1812.138 Lippmann believed that England’s violation of
international law by controlling Trans-Atlantic trade negatively impacted American economic
growth. While England and America became allies in the war, the growing American Navy
would eventually compete with the island nation for global hegemony.
Wilson’s affinity with the League of Nations, shown through his insistence of a signed
covenant early in the peace negotiations in France, was directly influenced by the Inquiry. A
staple of Wilson’s presidency was the formation of the League of Nations. The formation of the
League is always credited to Wilson, and rightfully so, but Lippmann’s work in the early days of
the League has been overshadowed by his later career. The League of Nations, as a reaction to
the German attempt at “world domination,” would be a collection of nations for “common
protection” and to “solve international disputes.”139 Another aspect of the League would be “the
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attainment of a joint economic prosperity”.140 Without an explanation by the members of the
Executive Committee it was difficult to pin down just what the Inquiry meant by the phrase. It
could have meant that all nations in the League would support economic policies that would
benefit all nations rather than just their own. But it could have also been an economic
opportunity for the United States in disguise. The early New Republic articles by Lippmann and
his colleagues about Pan-Americanism link to the fourteenth point. Lippmann was the chief
author of this draft, and there was a possibility of what is essentially an expanded Pan-American
Movement masked as the final point. But in this case the unifying entity was the League rather
than geographic location of the Western Hemisphere. “Joint economic prosperity” sounds quite
familiar to the symbiotic relationship marketed to the Latin American nations from 1914 through
1916. The establishment of the League of Nations presented the United States with the
opportunity to inconspicuously influence global affairs for national gain. The League, much like
the Pan-American movement, was advertised to the world as a mutually beneficial relationship.
But, both organizations had strong undercurrents of American economic exploitation aimed at
expanding American influence to new parts of the globe. Without concrete evidence there is no
clear answer as to the intentions of the statement. Based on Lippmann’s thoughts only two years
prior, a disguised symbiotic relationship was a possibility for the final point. Wilson ultimately
cut the phrase from his final draft of the Fourteen Points and replaced it with the guarantee of
“political independence and territorial integrity.”141
Advocating for the League of Nations and actually creating it were two completely
different things. Lippmann was the Secretary of Research of the Inquiry, but much of the
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research had been completed and research was sidelined in lieu of the concrete League
formulation as the armistice approached.142 Those trained in law, like David Hunter Miller,
assumed a stronger role in the Inquiry by late spring of 1918 to establish the guidelines for an
accepted covenant at the upcoming peace conference. Lippmann was not trained in law, and
found the Inquiry became increasingly boring compared to the early research and formulation of
the Fourteen Points. As the focus of the Inquiry shifted from thought formulation to procedural
development, Lippmann began searching for his next endeavor.
A loss of interest may not have been the only factor that drove Lippmann away from the
Inquiry. Actually, it was probably only a secondary reason for Lippmann’s departure. Walter
Lippmann was raised in a Jewish family and began his career when Anti-Semitism was rampant
around the world. The Inquiry was infiltrated by Anti-Semitism through Edward House and
Isaiah Bowman, the latter of which conspired against Lippmann with the help of House to hijack
the position of Secretary of Research. Anti-Semitism plagued the career of Bowman who quite
frankly came to hate Lippmann while the two worked together.143 Bowman was the leader of the
American Geographical Society where the Inquiry was stationed. He was also an up-and-coming
geographer that would wield great influence throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
While at the Inquiry, Bowman became in an increasingly aggressive egomaniac that took control
of the Inquiry by sabotaging the relationship of the Executive Committee members. Bowman
summarized his Machiavelli rise to Inquiry domination in a note written at the end of 1918.
Lippmann expressed to Bowman his discontent with Mezes as the leader of the group, calling the
geologist “lazy” and “controlling.” The young geographer concurred with Lippmann’s
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assessment of Mezes.144 That was until he turned his back on Lippmann by framing him as a
threat to the organization in a meeting with House. Bowman blamed the “extreme
disorganization” of the Inquiry in spring 1918 on Lippmann and suggested he himself should
become the Executive Officer of the Inquiry.145 As Executive Officer, Bowman would not only
assume Lippmann’s role of Secretary of Research, but he would also control the organizations
funding, hiring and firing.146 Bowman also won over the support of David Hunter Miller to kick
Lippmann off the Executive Committee and out the Inquiry for good. Miller even went so far as
saying that he never met anyone that didn’t “hate to work with Lippmann.”147 Once House
learned of Bowman’s true feelings towards Lippmann, he let the geographer in on a little secret.
House said to Bowman that the only reason Lippmann became a member of the Inquiry
was because the Wilson Administration had to “cooperate with the extreme liberals of the
country” and that Lippmann fit the mold of a pushover that could work on more personal matters
like Inquiry hiring with House.148 It was never the plan for Lippmann to fill such a crucial role as
the Secretary of Research. House later recalls his revulsion for Lippmann due to his Jewish faith,
but conceded that he was at least “one of the quiet Jews.”149 Lippmann was aware of the
crumbling foundation of the Inquiry when it became clear Bowman had betrayed him to
commandeer the role of Executive Officer, which was the man responsible for “men, money and
plans.”150 In hindsight, it seems that House, Miller, and Bowman may have underestimated the
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ability of the young Lippmann until he became a crucial figure in the drafting of the Fourteen
Points.
Lippmann’s departure from the Inquiry sent him back across the Atlantic. While he was
in Belgium during the outbreak of the war in August 1914, he later traveled to neighboring
France in 1918 after his time at the Inquiry to see the colossal conflict conclude. The second time
it was with the United States Expeditionary Forces in the Military Information Branch. As we
will see, Lippmann’s relatively uneventful time as an Army Captain in France (a seemingly
interesting position in 1918) had a lasting impact on his views of government and media control
through propaganda. Lippmann spent a month in London as an unofficial liaison for the Inquiry
by discussing United States war aims with its ally. House granted Lippmann permission to speak
on behalf of the Inquiry, and surprisingly gave him free reign of what to tell the British.151
Lippmann then relocated to France where the propaganda leaflets of Wilson’s speeches were
created and distributed.
Lippmann’s office in France was by no means the New York Public Library or the
American Geographical Society. Lippmann’s unpleasant time in France was spent in half of a
room with cold, propaganda poster covered walls and uncomfortable furniture stacked with
Woodrow Wilson speeches and other propaganda leaflets from France and England.152 The goal
of Lippmann’s propaganda was to differentiate between United States and European Allied
propaganda, but the outcome was propaganda typical of the other Allies. Like England and
France, the Military Information Branch focused on the treatment of German prisoners of war as
better than the treatment of German soldiers by their own government. Although Lippmann
found the work less than exhilarating, it was nonetheless deemed successful by Allied leaders
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based on the number of pamphlets found on captured German soldiers.153 Lippmann may have
escaped his downfall in the Inquiry by fleeing to France, but he encountered a similar type of
issue like the one he encountered in New York. The content of his work became dull, like the
post-Fourteen Points Inquiry work, and people within the organization were plotting against him.
This time it was George Creel. Creel spent his time before the war as a journalist and became the
head of American Propaganda in Europe during the war. During his time as a journalist, Creel
and Lippmann bickered in 1915 over a civil liberties issue that led Creel to hold a grudge.154
Lippmann worked independent of Creel in his propaganda organization, which Creel wished to
avoid at all costs. Creel went all the way to the top and appealed to Wilson for help in controlling
Lippmann. A few months before Lippmann departed to Europe, George Creel was plotting
against him. Wilson valued the advice of Creel which set Lippmann at a disadvantage. Creel
wrote Wilson saying “ I myself a somewhat in doubt as to the best attitude to adopt to Lippmann
and his associates.”155 His associates were the “extreme liberals” that forced House to place
Lippmann on the Inquiry when it was created. Wilson responded to Creel by agreeing his
“attitude towards what Lippmann and others have suggested is entirely correct.”156 So, when
Lippmann was in Europe, Creel was able to suppress the young propagandists work through the
end of the war by absorbing the Military Information Branch into his Committee of Public
Information in the fall of 1918.
On November 11, 1918 hostilities ceased between the Allied and Central Powers based
on the Fourteen Points. The very work that Lippmann spent months creating before he left for
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France was used for the armistice that effectively ended a world war. Propaganda became
irrelevant when the fighting ended, and Lippmann began planning for the peace conference. His
“old friends” at the Inquiry would be joining him in France along with hundreds of other
advisors, reporters and government entities.157 Lippmann hoped his departure from the Inquiry
was only temporary and his colleagues would welcome him back with open arms. By late 1918
Bowman had assumed leadership of the Inquiry and he would ultimately have the final say for
Lippmann joining the group in Paris. After the George Washington arrived in France in
December 1918 with the Inquiry on board, Lippmann anxiously awaited to join his colleagues
from his hole-in-the-wall propaganda office. The call to join the group never came and
Lippmann watched as Wilson paraded through the streets of Paris as the savior of the European
people. Lippmann eventually swallowed his pride and asked Bowman to rejoin the Inquiry.
Bowman’s resentment for Lippmann failed to subside and he sent Lippmann packing.158
Lippmann’s conflict with Creel weakened his relationship with Wilson, and Bowman’s control
of the Inquiry left Lippmann in Paris without a job. What seemed to be a time of great
opportunity at the beginning of a peace settlement turned out to be a time of exclusion and
isolation for the young Lippmann. So, while the euphoria of Wilson’s arrival swept through
Europe, Lippmann boarded a ship bound for New York before the conference even began.

“A Disillusioned World”
Walter Lippmann’s expansive career peaked in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s with two
Pulitzer Prize awards in journalism, one in 1958 and the other in 1962. His contributions to neoliberal political theory during the same period has captured a majority of scholarly attention,
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leaving little attention to the dawn of his career around World War I. Walter Lippmann’s time as
editor of the New Republic during the war gave him direct contact with the public. The United
States role in the war was heavily influenced by public opinion, the area in which Lippmann
would have the greatest influence in the early years of the war. The fact that Lippmann, at the
astonishingly young age of 25, had such a profound influence on an entire nations involvement
in a global war makes him a key figure in crafting American foreign policy during WWI. The
fusion of progressive political theory and economic domination of independent, sovereign
nations by Lippmann created the framework for what can be referred to as “progressive
imperialism”. Lippmann’s shift from the Roosevelt “big stick diplomacy” and outright colonial
domination to “progressive imperialism” under Wilson swayed the opinion of many progressives
to support U.S. entry in the war. The shift makes him a crucial figure in understanding not only
the course of American foreign policy after the war but in understanding the shift of the entire
global order on the eve of implosion for the previously Euro-Centric world, opening the door for
the American Century.
Lippman was by no means a pioneer of the Progressive movement, and the movement is
what directly influenced his views of America in a more global sense. In other words, he was a
product of the progressive movement. His work in the New Republic was directly influenced by
Herbert Croly and Walter Weyl, among others, and the two editors introduced Lippmann to the
“father of the progressive movement”, Theodore Roosevelt.159 Lippmann turned to the former
president for advice when the Great War broke out in late 1914. Alongside Roosevelt, but not to
the extent of immediate mobility of the armed forces, The New Republic advocated for entry into
the war. But Roosevelt’s knee-jerk rejection of war was so the United States could gather up on

159

Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy, 6.

51

the spoils of the conflict. The New Republic disagreed with that approach. Roosevelt’s outlandish
accusations of Wilson’s incompetence in the Mexican Civil War also led Lippmann to drift into
the Wilson Administration. The support of the Pan-American movement by the New Republic for
new economic markets showed a characteristic shift from Roosevelt’s outright colonial
domination to Wilson’s coercive sovereignty for economic benefit. Lippmann assimilated into
the Wilson Administration and subsequently caught the eye of Edward House. His connection to
House landed him the position of Secretary of Research for the Inquiry, where he would have his
greatest influence during the war. The climax of Lippmann’s work in the Inquiry was the
drafting of the Fourteen Points, whereby he advanced the establishment of sovereign nations
based on “self-government” from the ashes of the Central Powers. The immediate global
response to the Fourteen Points based on the culmination of Lippmann and the Inquiry’s work
along with Wilsonian ideals of democracy seemed to have ushered in a new wave of anticolonial sentiment.
An interesting paradox of Lippmann’s work during the war was that while he was
attempting to tear down the old empires of Europe by sparking a global movement of
independence, he was building the foundation of America’s twentieth-century empire. The
Fourteen Points were accepted by the Central Powers as the basis for the armistice to cease
hostilities on November 11, 1918. After decades, and in some cases centuries, it seemed to many
colonies that their break from the chains of imperialism became reality with Wilson’s rhetoric
heading into the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The expanded democratic ideals of selfgovernment struck a chord with future leaders like Ho Chi Minh, Mahatma Gandhi and Lala
Lajpat Rai, among many others. Lala Rai traveled around the United States and used it as the
model for modernizing an increasingly independent India. The American ideals of progressive
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democracy led Rai to believe that India could gain independence through educational reforms to
achieve a gradual release from their colonial binds to the British Empire.160 After catching word
of Wilson’s speeches during the war, including the “Peace Without Victory” speech and the
Fourteen Points Address, Rai claimed America was the “freest of all countries” and used the
Wilsonian progressive platform to inspire Indian reformers to gain independence through gradual
reforms rather than revolution.161 Rai became an important figure in the rise of both the Indian
National Congress and Mahatma Gandhi in post-war India. During the peace conference it
became clear to many nationalist Indian leaders that Wilson was not as powerful nor as
committed to the self-determination movement as previously thought and their faith in the once
anti-colonial leader waned, 162
Ho Chi Minh was a young kitchen assistant at the Ritz hotel during the peace conference
and a native to French Indochina in Southeast Asia, the jewel of the French Empire. The young
nationalist believed Wilson would help Southeast Asia gain independence from French colonial
rule. So, while in Paris, the young Minh wrote a petition to the president outlining his support
for Wilson’s advocacy for decolonization and his hope for the establishment of an independent
Vietnam.163 The vessel to which Minh gained independence from French rule did not matter, and
eventually communism seemed the strongest option to achieve his goal when his call to Wilson
went unanswered. In more simplistic terms, Wilson’s influence at the peace conference presented
him with the opportunity to generate positive relations with Vietnam five decades before the
Vietnam War. Rebuffed by Wilson, Minh then turned to Vladimir Lenin, the communist leader
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of the new communist state in Russia. He later claimed while reflecting on his gravitation to
Communism in the early 1920s that “Patriotism, not yet Communism, led me to have confidence
in Lenin.”164 Minh did not have the same in confidence in Wilson. Communism was the route
that would end at his goal of independence when Wilsonian democracy failed him. The initial
work of Lippmann in the Inquiry inadvertently influenced Minh’s appeal to Wilson in the
nascent stage of Vietnam-American relations that erupted in the Second Indochina War half of a
century later. Minh’s eventual critique of both American democracy and the Paris Peace
Conference’s outcome found an unlikely common ground with Lippmann.
The young army captain returned home from Europe in December 1919 disillusioned by
the work he had completed. It became clear to Lippmann that the conference would be
dominated by Great Power diplomacy of the Council of Three rather than control of the empires
in a collectivized effort by multiple nations. The League of Nations was created at the insistence
of Wilson at the conference before peace negotiations began. Ironically, the United States did not
join the League due to its failure to receive congressional approval after the conference.
Lippmann returned to the New Republic after the war and voiced his critical opinion of Wilson in
two issues of the magazine in May, 1919. In the eyes of Lippmann and the other editors, the
peace after the war was a complete failure. With the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the suppression of German power, the door was left wide open for the imperial
powers of Japan, Britain and France to secure territory either “outright or by mandate,” both of
which would only “entangle the United States… if the treaty (was) accepted.”165 The wave of
Wilsonian rhetoric before the conference was characterized by Lippmann as Wilson’s “days of
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glory” and ultimately the president was a failure for allowing the settlement to be dominated by
the “spirit of traditional diplomacy of Europe.”166 The disillusionment of the Paris Peace
Conference was more than just Lippmann’s immediate reaction to the “failure”. In Public
Opinion (1922), Lippmann had yet to come to terms with the peace conference outcome.
Lippmann critiqued democratic governments for their efforts to influence individual behavior to
prevent societal cohesion. He used the example of French propaganda during the war to boost
morale at the cost of individualism.167 He was also critical of the media, as he witnessed during
the war that “news and truth are not the same thing”.168 He claimed that the press had become
“an organ of direct democracy,” which paradoxically undermined the very roots of democracy by
shading the truth.169 Through Lippmann’s analysis, it was clear he was disappointed with
progressivism and democracy, the very ideals he held dear throughout much of the previous
decade. To round out Lippmann’s critique of democratic governments, he directly attacked the
“Big Three” of the Paris Peace Conference. He believed the men had become the “incarnation of
human hope” until they became “merely negotiators and administrators for a disillusioned
world” when the conference concluded.170 The disillusioned world was that in which Lippmann
was living, and based on America’s role in global affairs during the twentieth century, there may
have been some truth to the young journalist’s words.
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